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Analyzing the Concept and Moral Value of Epistemic and Scientific Humility

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Abstract

Philosophers such as Spinoza, Kant, and Nietzsche deny the moral value of "humility" and fundamentally do not regard it as a moral virtue. According to them, humility and modesty cannot possess positive moral value due to their conflict with values such as power, creativity, happiness, self-satisfaction, and self-confidence, which are essential for human advancement. This perception of the meaning and value of humility stands in opposition to the views of many ethical schools, especially religious traditions regarding the virtue of humility. In contemporary literature and some academic circles, this perspective has garnered special attention, leading to doubts among certain scholars about the inherent value of scientific humility. This article aims to examine the meaning and moral value of epistemic and scientific humility through both verbal and substantive content analysis methods. In this context, after presenting critiques and negative attitudes of philosophers and experts regarding the moral value of humility, the article elucidates the concept of humility and its virtuous nature.

Keywords

Ethics, moral value, virtue, humility, modesty, scientific humility.

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