An Ontological Examination of Moral Value from the Perspectives of Allameh Misbah Yazdi and John Dewey

Seyyed Morteza Honarmand*



Abstract

Realism and anti-realism, and more generally, the ontology of moral value, have always been among the most significant challenges faced by ethicists. The ontology of moral value addresses the key question of whether moral value exists as an independent reality from humans or is merely a matter of personal taste and social agreement. This article compares and analyzes the views of Allameh Misbah Yazdi and John Dewey using a descriptive-analytical method. It concludes that "moral value," from the perspective of both thinkers, is objective and real in the sense of being relational (causal and consequential) between human voluntary action and the desired perfection; it is not dependent on individual or societal preferences. Allameh Misbah Yazdi is an ethical realist, while John Dewey is an anti-realist and, consequently, is a relativist in terms of meta-ethical and epistemological perspectives. The root of this disagreement lies in their epistemological foundations regarding the definitions of truth, universality, and the relativity of moral values, as well as the overall criteria for moral value (public and objective interest from Misbah Yazdi's perspective and development derived from Darwinian principles from Dewey's perspective).

Keywords

Ontology, moral value, ethical realism, Allameh Misbah Yazdi, John Dewey.

^{*} Assistant Professor, Department of Theology and Islamic Knowledge, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Malayer University, Malayer, Iran. | sm.honarmand@malayer.ac.ir

