نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 کارشناسی ارشد رشته فلسفه اخلاق
2 دانشیار دانشگاه زنجان
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Bernard Williams introduced the notion of ‘moral luck’ to emphasize that the moral value is not independent of external circumstances, including luck; rather they are, to a great extent, dependent on luck. In ordinary lives, moral agents may well be praised or blamed because of doing things over which they do not have, at least complete, control. Indeed, these praises or blames are tied with good or bad consequences of the action that agents are lucky or unlucky to face. This is where moral luck comes into play. The problem of moral luck is interlocked with the problem of moral responsibility, highlighting the question that if according to the common sense, moral judgment should only be made about things under the control of the agent (the principle of control), then why do we sometimes judge on the basis of things outside the control of the agent? The problem will be more significant if we have an eye to the claim of evolutionary ethics, because if we are committed to the principle of control, no moral judgment can be valid. In this paper, I will illuminate and examine Williams’ approach to moral luck.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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