عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]چکیده [English]
Ontology of reasons is a topic in the broader area of the theory of reasons and is concerned with the kind of things reasons are. Factualism is one of the main views here, which treats reasons as facts. After some preliminary points, considerations for and against Factualism are reviewed. Although an attractive view, critics ascribe some unacceptable commitments to Factualism, including the thought that explanation is non-factive and that reasons play no causal role in action. In response, it is argued that by distinguishing motivating reasons from explanatory reasons, Factualism can find some way to respond to these objections or explain them away. Then, some considerations behind this distinction are explored, showing that the distinction is interesting regardless of the current debate, and Factualism's recourse to the distinction is not an ad hoc solution. Though the distinction helps Factualism to deal with some objections, we do not claim that the distinction alone is enough to respond to all objections to Factualism. This is the task of the last and the main section. The paper is closed by some concluding remarks.