نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری مدرسی اخلاق اسلامی دانشگاه معارف اسلامی قم
2 مدیر گروه اخلاق پژوهشگاه علوم و فرهنگ اسلامی
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The concept of moral expertise within the realm of normative ethics faces serious skepticism. Critics typically reject it based on three categories of arguments: the denial of the objectivity of moral values, the existence of widespread disagreement among ethicists, and concerns regarding the unethical consequences of according special authority to the moral judgments of certain individuals. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, this study first gathers and categorizes these arguments, then evaluates and critiques them—drawing upon moral realism and cognitivism while considering the foundations of Islamic ethics. The criteria for evaluation include the validity of the premises, the strength of their connection to the conclusion, and the conclusion's consistency with the research's accepted foundations. The findings indicate that the principle of epistemic expertise in ethics is defensible; however, within the framework of Islamic ethics, it must not be construed as an unconditional privilege or a form of self-proclaimed moral authority. Consequently, this article proposes a nuanced approach that acknowledges the possibility of such expertise while making its realization contingent upon a set of specific competencies.
کلیدواژهها [English]