نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکترای حقوق جزا و جرم شناسی دانشگاه تهران - دانش آموخته سطح چهار حوزه علمیه قم
2 دانشیار گروه حقوق جزا و جرم شناسی دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران
3 دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Although the rule of individuation of reactions has been worldly common and accepted in the system of criminal justice, it is still confronted with certain problems. Considering the problem of moral luck, the article seeks to provide a special account of this rule. The problem of moral luck challenges our moral assessments. The main objection is that when we do not have control over our behavior, how can we be blamed for it. One of the potential responses neglected by researchers in the pre-behavioral luck is to take into consideration the compatibilist view, and more importantly the problem of weakness of will. Weakness of will, as it will be explained later, may justify the different ways of moral assessments. This justification articulated in legal terms can offer a novel strong explanation for justifying the rule of individuation of reactions in the system of criminal justice. Relying on analytical research the present article shows that the compatibilist view can justify the principle of inflicting punishment; justifying the principle of inflicting punishment, the problem of weakness of will can lay the foundations for accepting the differences among reactions.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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