نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکترا، گروه فلسفه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران
2 دانشیار، گروه فلسفه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The issue of the types of moral concepts and the process of their attainment is one of the concerns of the philosophy of ethics. Despite extensive studies in the field of Mulla Sadra's ethics, previous research has focused on normative and descriptive ethics and has not examined in detail "the process of realization and attainment of moral concepts in the soul." Based on the foundations of transcendental wisdom, the present article attempts to first determine the ontological type of moral concepts and then explain the process of acquiring knowledge of them. The findings of the research show that moral concepts are a type of secondary philosophical intelligible; because they are abstracted from the specific way of realizing a voluntary act, they do not have an independent nature, their application is to skeptical instances, and, while realized, they do not lead to independent entities. In the next stage, the article shows that these concepts, like scientific forms, are abstract. Moral situations only play the role of intrinsic causes and bring the soul to the level of aptitude; then reason, as an abstract cause, imparts moral concepts to the soul. This process occurs at two levels: the particular and the general.
کلیدواژهها [English]